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COMMENTS
civil jury trials,92 there is some question as to whether the criminal cal-
endar was plagued as well.93 But, even were this the case, the demands
of expediency must never be permitted to displace valuable procedural
safeguards. For however desirable and convenient such innovations may at
first appear,
let it be again remembered that delays, and little inconveniences in the forms
of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more
fundamental matters; that . . . though begun in trifles, the precedent may
gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the
most momentous concern. 94
Michael Toomin
CHANGES IN EMPLOYER STRUCTURE AND OPERA-
TIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS
One of the most intriguing areas in the field of labor law deals with
what takes place between labor and management when the employer in-
stitutes substantial changes in the structure or operation of his business.
The types of changes considered by our courts to have significant effect
are dissolution or liquidation, reorganization, merger, sale and, more re-
cently, relocation and closing down of part of an operation when done in
conjunction with a subcontracting of the operation. The years 1935 to
date have seen great changes in this area of labor law. Some of the old
common law and statutory solutions were retained and others discarded.
This comment will examine these changes and discuss methods of collec-
tive bargaining under these conditions.
ORIGINS OF THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
Certain general principles of corporation law have always governed
this area. If a corporation is merely a reorganization, a continuation, or a
purchaser of a former corporation and has substantially the same stock-
holders, the new, or surviving corporation is bound by the former's con-
92 Even today, after seven years of Rule 24-1, plus the additions to the bench result-
ing from the Judicial Article, there is still a delay of more than five years. CHIcAGO
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10, 1965, p. 10, col. 1.
93 It must be remembered that the constitutional command of a speedy trial, supra
note 69, has been interpreted by the Legislature to mean that the defendant in a crimi-
nal prosecution must be brought to trial within 120 days unless he is responsible for
the delay. This provision was formerly known as the Four Term Act, and can be
found today in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5.
94 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 350 (12th ed. 1794).
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tracts.' If a parent corporation causes dissolution of its subsidiary, the par-
ent is bound to perform all the outstanding written contracts of the
subsidiary. 2 This varies from the law regarding mergers and acquisitions
where the extent to which there is duplication of parties and interests, and
also whether there is a voluntary assumption of the obligations, is even
more crucial. 3
In an employment contract situation, the employment is usually for a
specific term. Payment must be given for the whole term notwithstanding
merger,4 relocation,5 destruction of the business or insanity of the owner,6
or simple dissolution.7 Employment contracts also require notice to be
given of changes in the nature of the employer. If this is not done, the
former employer can be held liable for money due from the successor to
the employees who did not receive such notice.8 However, if there was
no set term, or if the employee had been notified of the change, the em-
ployment could be terminated at will, in the former case, or on good
cause for the latter.9 An express assumption of the outstanding contracts
and obligations by a successor will clearly bind it, while a mere invitation
1 Meeks v. Arkansas Light and Power, 147 Ark. 232, 227 S.W. 405 (1921); Alden v.
Wright, 175 App. Div. 692, 162 N.Y.S. 668 (1916).
2 Hughes Tool v. Comm'r., 147 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1945). Cf., Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930, 933 (1st Cir. 1940), petition for cert. dismissed, 312
U.S. 710 (1941).
3 Brabham v. Southern Express Co., 124 S.C. 157, 117 S.E. 368, (1923), cert. denied
sub nom. American Ry. Express Co. v. Brabham, 261 U.S. 614 (1923); Kentucky Beaver
Collieries v. Mellon and Smith, 200 Ky. 198, 254 S.W. 421 (1923); Globe Oil Mills v.
Van Camp Sea Food, 52 Cal. App. 781, 199 P. 864 (1921).
4 Chipman v. Turner, Day and Woolworth Mfg. Co., 32 Ky. Law Rep. 680, 106
S.W. 852 (1908).
5 Masonite Corp. v. Handshoe, 44 So. 2d 41 (Miss. 1956).
6 Madden v. Jacobs, 52 La. Ann. 2107, 28 So. 225 (1900); Macon Canning Co. v.
Roberts, 26 Ga. App. 147, 105 S.E. 734 (1921); Sands v. Potter, 59 Ill. App. 206, 212
(1894), aff'd., 165 Il. 397, 46 N.E. 282 (1896).
7 Martin v. Star Publishing Co., 50 Del. Rep. 181, 126 A.2d 238 (1956); Parsil v.
Emery, 242 App. Div. 653, 272 N.Y.S. 439 (1934).
8 Marrietta and North Georgia RR. v. Hilburn, 75 Ga. 379 (1885); North Chicago
Rolling Mill v. Hyland, 94 Ind. 448 (1883); Baker v. Appleton and Co., 107 App. Div.
358, 95 N.Y.S. 125 (1905) aff'd., 187 N.Y. 548, 80 N.E. 1104 (1907). The question of
notice is one for the jury: Tousignant v. Shafer Iron Co., 96 Mich. 87, 55 N.W. 681
(1893). The same extends to "labor contracts" as distinguished from "employment
contracts": Druck v. Antrim Lime Co., 177 Mich. 364, 143 N.W. 59 (1913); Benson
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 124 Minn. 222, 144 N.W. 774 (1914). See North v. York
Metal and Alloys Co., 281 Pa. 99, 126 At. 207 (1924), as to using the terms of the
former contract to regulate what constitutes notice.
9Trustees of Soldiers' Orphans' Home v. Shaffer, 63 Ill. 243 (1872); Watson v.
Guigno, 204 N.Y. 535, 541, 98 N.E. 18, 20 (1913).
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to employees to continue in their present positions, whether express or
implied, will only apply to the workers' general positions, and they can
be discharged at will despite the provisions of the former contract.10
All of the above employment relations are governed by an employment
contract or a labor contract. An employment contract is one between the
employer and employee as individual parties, and no two employees need
have the same terms. The labor contract is one which covers a group of
laborers and provides common rates for similar work. The labor contract
is still essentially individual, as each employee is free to enter into second-
ary agreements with the employer, or the latter may give special benefits
to select individuals."1
A collective bargaining contract is quite different and is not individual-
ized at all. The courts have clearly differentiated it from an employment
contract by holding that the bargaining agreement merely governs the
relationship of employer and employee and confers some benefits on all
employees covered as a class; i.e., labor, while each employee still makes
an individual employment contract with the employer.' 2
While labor and employment contracts are not binding on an uncon-
senting successor, a collective bargaining contract is not considered simi-
lar and is not subject to the standard rules governing the liabilities and
obligations of successor corporations. A collective bargaining contract is a
code intended to cover a variety of cases and cannot be expected to an-
ticipate every eventuality. 13 It is because of the different nature of this
contract, from its two predecessors, that the field of labor law emerged.
Yet, while the labor statutes have caused much change, it will be seen that
some few areas within the field remained virtually unchanged.' 4
10 Western Union RR. Co. v. Smith, 75 111. 496 (1874); Morrison v. Ogdensburg and
Lake Champlain RR. Co., 52 Barbour (N.Y.) 173 (1868); Aldridge v. Fore River Ship-
building Co., 201 Mass. 131, 87 N.E. 485 (1909).
11 SPENGLER AND KLEIN, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS 217 et seq. (2d ed. 1939).
12 j. 1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Division No. 1344 v. Tampa Electric
Co., 47 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1950).
13 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
14 The pertinent provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are:
S 7: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing ....." (29 U.S.C. S 157 (1965).)
S 8(a) (1),(3), and (5): "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
"(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercize of rights guar-
anteed in section 157 of this title; ...
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
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DISSOLUTION, REORGANIZATION AND SHAMS
The area covering dissolution and reorganization was largely un-
changed by the advent of the NLRA and related state acts. Amelotte v.
Jacob Dold Packing Co.15 made it clear that a collective bargaining agree-
ment only covers wages, hours and general working conditions and, while
the contract runs for a stated term, there is no obligation to remain in
business for that term or pay wages for the term as there is under an em-
ployment contract. While the employing corporation has a right to dis-
solve, the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as the
NLRA) has been held to require that this dissolution be in good faith for
valid business reasons which may include the inability to pay higher costs
and wages at a recently organized plant where the employer is already on
the verge of severe financial loss. 16 But where the employer admits that it
is opposed to the union, and is in the greatest part motivated by this op-
position, the court will not uphold the dissolution and will find an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a) (5). 17 The courts will refuse to consider
the matter of intent where there is such a substantial financial loss as
clearly indicates a valid reason for closing.18 The termination of the con-
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization;...
"(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
." (29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1),(3), and (5) (1965).)
§ 8(b) (3): "(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, .... " (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)-
(3) (1965).)
§ 8(d) (1) and (2): "(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,... but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Pro-
vided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering em-
ployees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless
the party desiring such termination or modification-
"(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof...
"(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating
a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; . . ." (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1) and (2) (1965).)
All section references in the text are to these NLRA provisions.
15 173 Misc. 477, 17 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1940), Aff'd., 260 App. Div. 984, 24 N.Y.S.2d 134
(1940). Cf., dicta in Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587, 592, 593 (3d Cir.
1940). Accord, Division No. 1344 v. Tampa Electric Co., supra note 12.
16NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (Ist Cir. 1962); Phillips v. Bur-
lington Industries, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 589 (N.D.Ga. 1961).
17 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
18 See supra note 16. Cf., Note, 15 ALA. L. REV. 195 (1962).
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tract must still conform to the requirements of section 8(d)(1) of the
NLRA. But, as with many other obligations, the contractual obligation to
arbitrate remains and is not ended by dissolution if service of notice of
arbitration is made prior to actual dissolution.19
In considering reorganization, it should be noted that a company being
managed by its debtors is no different than any other employer and can-
not hide behind a fictitious change in structure at the end of the reorgan-
ization proceeding in order to avoid liability for the special debt of back
pay.20 In NLRB v. Richards,21 the corporation had gone through many
changes in structure, ownership and location, and there was a three-year
hiatus from doing business in a particular city. The court held that the
resumption of operations in the old location was not a resumption of the
former business so that the former collective bargaining agreement could
not be applied.
The requirement of good faith brings up the area of sham changes and
alter egoes. This appears to be a very common method of attempting to
avoid NLRB orders, but it is notoriously frought with failure despite the
many ways of doing it.22
The first method of avoiding these orders is the shutting down of all or
part of the plant, after unionizing, followed by leasing or subcontracting
to a dummy corporation. Such actions constitute unfair labor practices
under sections 8(a) (1) and (3).23 Moreover, the refusal to bargain over
the shutdown's effect on labor is also an unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8(a) (5).24
Secondly, where a successor corporation or company is organized by
the original one to take over its operations in order to avoid a union or
NLRB order, there is clearly an unfair labor practice. 25 The Court set
down its rule as to where the question should be determined in the fol-
lowing manner:
Whether there was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership
or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer is a question of fact
19 Application of Delphi Mfg. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 337, 157 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1956). As to
merger, see supra note 13.
20 NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942).
21265 F.2d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1959).
22 Comment, 19 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 112, 121-122 (1963).
23NLRB v. O'Keefe and Merritt Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1949); Bon Hen-
nings Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1962).
24 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 17; NLRB v. United States
Air Conditioning Co., 302 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1962).
2 5SSouthport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942); NLRB v. Hopwood
Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938), reaffirmed on contempt hearing, 104 F.2d 302
(2d Cir. 1939); De Bardeleben v. NLRB, 135 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1943).
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properly to be resolved by the Board [NLRB] in direct resort to it, or by the
court, if contempt proceedings are instituted.2 0
In NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 27 Artware was one of three Kentucky
corporations which were wholly-owned subsidiaries, except for qualify-
ing shares, of Deena Products, Inc., an Illinois corporation. Deena was in
turn wholly owned by one Weiner, except for qualifying shares, and all
the directors of the various corporations were Weiner, his wife, his son
and his secretary. In order to avoid the effect of NLRB orders decreeing
back pay and reinstatement for certain employees who were discharged
after a strike,28 Weiner used various financial artifices to siphon Artware's
assets off to Deena Products and one of the other subsidiaries, including
all plants and machinery.2 9 On certiorari regarding certain contempt pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court stated:
We think the Board [NLRB] is entitled to show that these separate corpo-
rations are not what they appear to be, that in truth they are but divisions
or departments of a "single enterprise. 3 0
The court then quoted with approval a statement by Justice Cardozo:
Dominion may be so complete, interference so obstrusive, that by the rule
of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where
control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice.31
Thirdly, changes which do not result in any alteration of the financial
structure or net income, or where the income is paid to the true owner as
rent or in some similar manner, are held to be "disguised continuances"
under the rule in the Southport case, even where there is some change in
product line or a change from a corporation to a partnership.
2
Fourthly, when there is a structural change which generally leaves per-
sonnel and practices unaltered, save for the elimination of union members,
there is a clear unfair labor practice which violates rights set out in sec-
tion seven of the NLRA. The effect of the labor legislation can clearly be
26 Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, supra note 25 at 106 (1942). This case also
goes beyond mere financial change to look at the actual personnel exercizing control
over the company.
27 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
2886 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949), enforced, NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc. 198 F.2d 645
(1952); 112 N.L.R.B. 371 (1955), enforced, NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 228 F.2d 870.
29 Facts taken from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, supra note 27 at 404-09.
80 Supra note 27 at 402.
31 Supra note 27 at 403, citing from Berkey v. Third Avenue R. Co., 244 N.Y. 84,
95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). For a long list of citations concerning various sham
arrangements see cases cited in footnotes 1 through 5, 361 U.S. at 403.
82 NLRB v. Adel Clay Products, 134 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. E. C. Brown,
184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284, 285, 287 (1st
Cir. 1954), where there was a "sale" from father to son; and NLRB v. Ozark Hard-
wood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960).
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seen in this area. In Berry v. Old South Engraving Co.,33 prior to the
NLRA, it was found that an employer had set up a new corporation
which performed the same functions as its predecessor except that eleven
union employees were replaced by twelve non-union workers. The court
held that since the organizing of the new corporation was without fraud,
the discharges were valid due to the fact that the requisite one-week no-
tice before discharge was given in accordance with the collective bar-
gaining contract. Thirty years later, the result was just the opposite, the
only difference in the facts being that the new company was located one-
half mile from the old one.34 The court found obvious violations of sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Since there was also a refusal to bargain, the
court also found an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a) (5),
and this is now the general position of the courts in these cases. 35
CLOSING DOWN
Closely allied to the problems of shams, alter egoes and dissolutions is
that of the wrongful closing or threat to close. The prohibition by section
8(a) (1) of any interference with the protected rights of section seven to
self-organization and freedom of choice in selecting representatives are
the major concerns in this area. The simplest type of case is also the most
common in this area, and it lies at one end of a spectrum whose areas of
decision become more and more gray as the case becomes more complex.
The simple case is one where the employer, prior to an election during an
organizing drive, makes a straight forward statement that he would rather
close down than accede to the union if the workers voted for it. This type
of coercion is uniformly condemned by the courts.3 6 When this coercion
is coupled with the discharge of some suspected union activists, the em-
ployer can also be charged with violations of section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.3 Moreover, it does not matter whether the cause of the threat is a
certification election or a demand for a union shop.
38
33 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933).
34 NLRB v. Royal Oak Tool and Machine Co., 320 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1963).
35 See also, Cardinale Trucking Co., 5 NLRB 220 (1938); Comment, supra note 22 at
122 et seq.
36 Peoples Motor Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.2d 903 (4th Cit. 1948); NLRB v.
Ferguson, 257 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir., 1958); NLRB v. Taitel, 261 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944; NLRB v. Hudson Pulp and Paper Corp., 273 F.2d 660 (5th
Cit. 1960); NLRB v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB
v. Byrds Mfg. Co., 324 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1963); and NLRB v. South Rambler Co.,
324 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963). See also, Von der Ahe Van Lines, 1965 C.C.H. N.L.R.B.
9769, wherein the employer threatened to blow up his plant if the union won bar-
gaining rights.
37 NLRB v. Marydale Products Co., 311 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1963).
38 NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., 199 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. den.., 344 U.S. 928.
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Stating the coercive threat in more delicate terms, by not making it as
direct, has no effect on the courts' decisions, even where there is another
part of the employer's operation to which the work can be transferred.39
Further down into the gray area of the spectrum, the courts still give
every benefit of the doubt to the union. The courts will find coercion
where the employer's statement is that it is "likely" it will go out of busi-
ness if the employees vote for a union,40 and where the statement is a
mere suggestion of the possibility, so long as it is in the face of a certifica-
tion election.41 Even in instances where the company was on the margin
of loss or already had an unprofitable operation, while going out of busi-
ness could not be attacked, unfair labor practices were found because the
employer's statements as to the seriousness of the financial trouble were
stated in such a way as possibly to influence the voting prior to the elec-
tion.42 A very recent decision has also extended this to a case where the
election was between a certified union and a rival, and the employer
stated that he was barely able to afford one union and would probably
have to close one plant if the rival were chosen for that plant. 43
In the case of Order of RR. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.RR., 44
the railroad wanted to close some of its stations and the union resisted
and discussed it with the railroad. The union was found to have bargained
with reasonable effort.45 Furthermore, since the company had bargained
with the union over this issue, it was held that there was a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.46 The com-
pany was, therefore, powerless to get an injunction to restrain the union
from striking in order to win its point.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co. 47 was a case involving a threat
to close, and an actual closing, of a subsidiary corporation whose owner-
ship pattern was similar to that in the Deena Artware case. The subsidiary
was one of a group of seventeen subsidiaries manufacturing textiles which
were marketed by a single marketing company, Deering Milliken. This
30 NLRB v. Todd Co., Inc., 173 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. den., 340 U.S. 864 (1950);
NLRB v. West Point Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 783, 784 (5th Cir. 1957).
40 NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese, 322 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1963).
41 NLRB v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1939); NLRB v. Mall
Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1941).
42NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1948); NLRB v. Drennon Food
Products Co., 272 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1959).
43 Majestic Molded Products v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1964).
44 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
4545 U.S.C. S§ 152 (1), 156. These provisions are similar to the good faith provisions
of section 8(b) (3), supra note 14.
46 29 U.S.C. § 101-115, as amended. 47 Supra note 17.
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company was in turn controlled by the Milliken family. The president of
Darlington, Roger Milliken, threatened to close the mill if the Textile
Workers Union won a representational election which was coming up
six months later. When the union did win, and Milliken was unsuccessful
in getting the employees to sign petitions disavowing the union, the mill
was closed. The Court stated:
[i]t is only when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the business
justification for the employer's action that § 8(a)(1) is violated. [Citations
omitted.] A violation of § 8(a) (1) alone therefore presupposes an act which is
unlawful even absent a discriminatory motive. Whatever may be the limits
of § 8(a)(1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management
prerogative that they would never constitute violations of § 9(a) (1), whether
or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they also violated
§ 8(a)(3). Thus it is not questioned in this case that an employer has the right
to terminate his business, whatever the impact of such action on concerted
activities, if the decision to close is motivated by other than discriminatory
reasons. But such action, if discriminatorily motivated, is encompassed within
the literal language of § 8(a)(3).48
Justice Harlan seemed motivated by a desire to preserve an owner's right
to close down his business at any time he may so wish. However, if there
had been only the threat to close, and not an actual closing, the court
probably would have found a clear violation of section 8(a) (1) of the
NLRA. 49 While Justice Harlan concluded that Darlington, as a single en-
terprise, had the right to close and would not violate the NLRA in so
doing, he held that if Darlington were not viewed as a single enterprise,
the result would not be the same. The opinion further held:
By analogy to those cases involving a continuing enterprise we are con-
strained to hold, . . . , that a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(a)(3) if motivated by purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining
plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably have fore-
seen that such closing would likely have that effect 80
The Court then remanded the case for further findings regarding the ef-
fect of the close on other Deering Milliken plants.
RELOCATION, MERGER AND SALE
The problems involved with relocation are very similar to those found
in the closing of an operation. Again, one must be sure that company ac-
tions do not interfere with union activity or constitute a refusal to bar-
gain. The NLRB has tried to go further and prohibit employers from
relocating in anticipation of union demands or elections, but it failed and,
48 Supra note 17 at 269 (emphasis added). The NLRB had reasoned that since the
closing was a violation of section 8(a) (3), the gradual discharges of all employees con-
stituted violation of section 8(a) (1). Id. at 267, n. 6.
49 See cases supra notes 36-43. 50 Supra note 17 at 275.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
as with closing, any independent economic motive will suffice to void the
unfair labor practice charge.51 A recent series of cases has pointed out
that the courts will hold a threat to relocate as much an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA as a threat to close.5 2 While
the employer is not permitted to anticipate union demands, once they are
made, he is free to accelerate a transfer to a second plant as a result of his
ability to foresee the increase in costs, but the refusal to bargain over the
effect of the relocation is still an unfair labor practice.
5 3
Relocaton is a more refined situation than closing, since the latter's
problems usually arise in the heat of the organizing, while the former's
are frequently the subject of collective bargaining. This means that em-
ployer and union are better able to settle these differences in a manner
more acceptable to both, and, therefore, when these problems come to
court, they are frequently in the form of a contract action or an enforce-
ment of arbitration proceedings rather than unfair labor practice charges.
An early decision held that where the contract provided that the em-
ployer should not move his factory outside the city during the life of the
agreement, an injunction would lie to prevent the employer from open-
ing up anywhere else in the state, even though the court would not make
the employer return and continue to operate at a loss.
54
A later decision, seemingly contra, perhaps hinges on the fact that the
business had not yet effected its relocation, and the court felt free to en-
join the change of locale and a closing of the operation.5 5 But, where the
contract expressly covered only a certain area, its seniority provisions
could not be extended to a new state which was outside the jurisdiction
of the contract.56 The courts have upheld the extension of union security
provisions to new locations and breach of contract actions with extensive
damages awarded to the union for dues lost, but only where the parties had
freely bargained for such clauses in the contract.57 Generally, it may be
said that the courts favor the parties coming to their own agreement ei-
51 Note, 77 H~av. L. REv. 1100, 1101-02 (1964).
52 W. Ralston & Co., Inc., 131 NLRB 912 (1961), enforced, NLRB v. W. Ralston &
Co., Inc., 298 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Ken-Lee, Inc. v. NLRB, 311 F.2d
608 (5th Cir., 1963); Marshfield Steel Co. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1963); and
A. P. Green Fire Brick Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1964).
53 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
54 Goldstein v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 328 Pa. 385, 196 Atl.
43 (1938).
55 Application of Pocketbook Workers Union of New York, 14 Misc. 2d 268, 149
N.Y.S.2d 56 (1956).
56 Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962).
-7 International Union, U.A.W.-C.I.O. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1956);
Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
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ther by contract or by arbitration and will readily enforce these agree-
ments or results.
The area of merger usually causes little trouble other than questions of
appropriate bargaining unit and representation which are better left to a
consideration of those topics. It can be noted briefly that the courts will
favor the principle of parity as to seniority, as opposed to subornation,
and where an accretion to the appropriate unit can be found in lieu of a
new unit, the former will be favored.58 But the successor must be sure to
bargain or arbitrate with the old union as to the effect of the merger.
A merger does not terminate the rights of the disappearing corporation
and its local union. Since national labor policy favors arbitration over tests
of strength,5 9 if an intention to arbitrate can be found from a fair inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement, it will be favored. In
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., v. Livingston,60 the Court held:
[t]he disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically
terminate all the rights of the employees covered by the agreement, and that,
. . . , the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union
under the agreement. 6'
The case also holds that where union grievances, concerning conditions
for which specific provisions had been made in the collective bargaining
contract, are not clearly unreasonable, and the contract contains an arbi-
tration clause, they must be arbitrated, notwithstanding the merger. It is
of no effect that the union no longer represented a majority of the em-
ployees after the merger took place.
Most of the other problems involving merger are similar to many in-
volving liquidation, sale, reorganization, etc., and are properly called
"successor problems." These hinge on the interpretation of that part of an
NLRB order which extends to a corporation's "successors and assigns."
This is an area in itself, since the decision in each case depends very much
on the facts of that individual case.
Sale is virtually the same as merger, even to the extent that most of it
properly belongs under the head of "successor problems." It should be
noted that a sale, unlike merger, works a discharge of employees, and
contractual obligations regarding severance pay must be observed even
58 Commercial Telegraphers Union v. Western Union Telegraph Co. Inc., 53 F. Supp.
90 (D.D.C. 1943) and NLRB v. J. W. Rex Co., 243 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1957).
59 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1956); United Steel Work-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960); United Steel Workers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
60 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The Court gave enforcement under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185, 1965).
61 Id. at 548.
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where workers continue in their former positions without interruption.0 2
Also, in sales, one must look closely at the contract of sale to ascertain
what obligations are assumed and note those which are expressly refused
by the purchaser. 3 In general, a sale of assets will not continue a collective
bargaining contract unless there is fraud, alter ego or assumption of obli-
gations in the contract.6 4
REFUSAL TO BARGAIN AND SUBCONTRACTING
In the 1960's, the courts started to wield the weapon of prohibiting the
refusal to bargain, coupled with the addition of subcontracting as an ad-
ded "change in operation." It was in 1952 that the courts first handed
down a strong interpretation of the refusal to bargain. 5 In 1960, it was
held that where a business operation was losing money and the entire
company was barely profitable, the unprofitable operation could be sub-
contracted when it was foreseeable that impending unionization of the
workers involved would raise costs in the operation. 6 It was held that
there was no unfair practice either in closing the operation without notice
or in refusing to bargain. This appeared to be a set-back until, in the case
of Royal Optical Mfg. Co.,6 7 the NLRB held that the concealing of plans
to relocate was not a management privilege and constituted a refusal to
bargain in good faith under section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA. This case fol-
lowed Zdanok v. Glidden,8 which held that a mere change in location
cannot unilaterally end a contract's seniority provisions, and that there is
an obligation to maintain prior seniority. It also held, in effect, that man-
agement must now spell out in the contract those management rights of
which it wanted to be assured as the courts will look to the protection
of the workers above all.69 Two more cases further indicated the general
shift by holding that the failure of the employer even to tell the union
02 Mathews v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 215 Minn. 369, 10 N.W.2d 230 (1943). But
see infra, note 78.
63 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,
189 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951); Erie Coach Co. v. Erie Bus Co., 399 Pa. 76, 160 A.2d 405
(1960).
64 Comment, supra note 22 at 124.
65 NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
66NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960).
67 135 NLRB 64 (1962).
68288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), affirmed on other grounds, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). See
Comment, 14 LAB. L.J. 388 (1963).
69 Comment, 47 MINN. L. REv. 505, 527, 529 (1963). Cf., Comment, 14 LAB. L.J. 366,
372, 373 (1963), wherein the author seems to accuse the court of writing its own legis-
lation while at the same time he applauds the result reached.
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that there was nothing to bargain about in a merger situation,70 and that
not bargaining about the effect of a shutdown followed by a subcontract,
were refusals to bargain.7'1 In Town and Country Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
NLRB72 and Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,73 it was held
that before subcontracting of a major operation could be undertaken, the
decision to subcontract, as well as the effect of the decision, must be the
subject of collective bargaining. In each case, the refusal to bargain was
found to be a violation of section 8(a)(5). However, NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, Inc.74 held on similar facts that the employer need not bargain
as to the decision to subcontract, as this is a management right. It was
still considered an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively
as to the effect of the decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fibreboard to resolve the con-
flict in the circuits.7 5 In Fibreboard, the union gave notice and offered to
meet with the corporation pursuant to sections 8(d)(1) and (2) of the
NLRA. Four days prior to the termination of the contract, the corpora-
tion met with the union and announced its decision to terminate the con-
tract of the plant's maintenance unit and to subcontract the work to an
independent concern in an effort to cut costs. The Court held that such
a subcontracting arrangement was a "condition of employment" within
the scope of section 8(d) and followed its opinion in Local 24, Teamsters
Union v. Oliver76 on the same topic.7 7 The Court then turned to the ques-
tion of reinstatement and affirmed the order of the NLRB for reinstate-
ment with back pay for the corporation's violation of section 8(a) (5) .78
Chief Justice Warren spelled out the public policy considerations when
he stated:
7o NLRB v. Aluminum Tubular Corp., 299 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1962).
71 NLRB v. United States Air Conditioning Co., supra note 24. Contra, NLRB v.
Lassing, note 66 supra.
72 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963), enforcing, 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
73 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), enforcing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), aff'd., 379 U.S.
203 (1964).
74 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644 (1965) (per
curiam).
75 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1965). Three
other circuits had taken the Adams Dairy position prior to the decision in that case.
Id. at 224, n. 11. See also, Farmer, Bargaining Requirements In Connection with Sub-
contracting, Plant Removal, Sale of Business, Merger and Consolidation, 14 LAB. L.J.
957, 960-1, 963, 966-7 (1963).
76 358 U.S. 283 (1959). 77Supra note 7 5at 212-15.
78 Id. at 215-17. But see Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Products, Inc., 243 F. Supp.
755 (E.D. Mo. 1965), wherein it was held that where a plant was closed at the termina-
tion of the contract, severance pay would not be given as the situation was not pro-
vided for in the contract.
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[olne of the primary purposes of the Act [NLRA] is to promote the peaceful
settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies
to the mediating influences of negotiation. The Act was framed with an aware-
ness that refusals to confer and negotiate had been one of the most prolific
causes of industrial strife. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 42-43. To hold, as the Board [NLRB] has done, that contracting out
is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining 'would promote the funda-
mental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and
management within the framework established by Congress as most conducive
to industrial peace3 9
PREVENTIVE BARGAINING
Collective bargaining in situations such as those covered in this com-
ment is apt to take place in the face of very bitter attitudes on the part
of both management and labor. Management resents having to bargain
with labor on an issue or decision which had always been considered one
of management's prerogatives.8 0 Labor is sorely distressed by the prospect
of unemployment which will face all or part of the workers at the plant.
The union also faces a substantial, if not complete, loss of membership
and dues. Much of the bitterness may be avoided if these issues were bar-
gained over before they actually arise. Thus, preservation of seniority
rights in the event of a sale, merger or relocation is a proper and sensible
subject for collective bargaining at the regular contract bargaining time
whether or not management is actually contemplating such action.
This type of preventive and prospective bargaining only makes good
sense for both sides. It safeguards management from a possible violation
of section 8(a) (5) at a time when management may well feel that there
is little left to be said. It also can save labor the cost and time of expensive
suits for enforcement of its bargaining rights under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act."' In the event of any inability to agree
on some of the specifics, both sides can turn to an arbitration clause simi-
lar to the one upheld in the Wiley case.8 2 Such solutions help avoid a
costly strike which can only bring harm to both management and labor
with its resultant animosity, ruinous expense and loss of wages.
In situations involving relocation and subcontracting, bargaining will
go best if both sides are willing to sit down and discuss actual facts and
figures relating to cost. There is always the possibility that labor can come
up with a solution that management had not foreseen with regard to re-
ducing costs and eliminating the need for an action which, absent "anti-
79 Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
80 See text at supra note 48.
81 See supra note 60, which discusses this point in relation to 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1965).
8L Supra note 60.
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union animus, ' '83 neither side particularly desires, but management views
as a necessity.
Perhaps this is the place where cost accounting and management finan-
cial analysis can aid both sides. It is not proposed that management re-
linquish its right to make its own decisions. Management should, how-
ever, attempt, in good faith, to bargain with the union as to these prob-
lems which so vitally concern all the employees. Labor, for its part, must
be prepared to devise and advance solutions to problems which are primarily
management's. Blind insistence on wage increases, when pressed against a
company which is seriously considering liquidation due to operating losses,
will serve only to affirm management's tentative decision to close down.8 4
Union resistance to more economical and automated modes of production
may have the same result. Yet, too great a concession on labor's part may
result in a situation similar to that which exists in some parts of West
Virginia and Pennsylvania where a few mine workers are enjoying excel-
lent wages and the companies have high efficiency at the cost of thousands
of persons being unemployed. This is probably best avoided by more
gradual phasing of the changeovers through attrition, as achieved in the
railroad industry, and by more extensive use of federal retraining pro-
grams. Both sides must bear these considerations in mind when facing such
a situation.
Lastly, preventive bargaining can dispose of many of the technical
problems which may arise from any of the actions considered in this com-
ment. A contract can specify whether it continues in effect after a sale,
liquidation, or closing down, provide for which solutions to the terminal
problems shall govern and whether grievance procedures shall continue.8 5
Such a contract would avoid the need for resort to the courts or to fed-
eral administrative boards in lengthy and costly grievance procedures.86
Lastly, preventive bargaining would further promote labor peace at a
time when it is most needed.
83 Supra note 17 at 267. See N.L.R.B. v. Friedman, -- F.2d -- , 52 L.C. 16, 680
(3rd Cir. 1965), wherein there was a refusal to bargain by the company over the con-
tracting out of an operation. The court affirmed a district court order enforcing a
subpoena requiring the employer to turn over certain financial records to the union for
its expert to analyze for support of charges of unfair labor practices under sections 8 (a)
(1) (3).
84 Labor must take care not to violate section 8(b) (3) of the NLRA under such
circumstances.
85 This would predispose of some of the problems raised in the Wiley case, supra
note 60; Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); and Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 344 F.2d 300 (1965), cert. den. Oct. 11, 1965.
(34 U.S.L. WEEK 3119, Oct. 12, 1965). See also Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Products,
Inc., supra note 78.
86 Cf., B. of L. F. & E. v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 341 F.2d 215 (1965), cert. den.
Oct. 11, 1965. (34 US.L. WEEK 3119, Oct. 12, 1965.)
